

Syllabus

Quantitative Security Studies

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Instructor: Jared Edgerton
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Office Hours: TBD
Meeting Place & Time: TBD
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Rationale and Scope

This course has multiple goals. First, it is an attempt to acquaint you with the quantitative literature on conflict and war. As that literature is far too voluminous to ingest in a single semester, it presents a sample. Second, it is an attempt to bring you up to date on that literature. Third, it is an attempt to reinforce the notion that graduate students should be active consumers of information. Fourth, it is designed to give you practice in writing detailed and constructive literature reviews. Given that optimization of anything along four separate dimensions is difficult at best, it may not achieve these goals perfectly, but I hope it will achieve them. And fifth, to expand the quantitative international relations literature beyond GLMs. To promote more outside-the-linear-model thinking, we will explore a variety of less-utilized (in political science) but promising ways of thinking about social phenomena that could find useful application in international relations.

Evaluation

Your final grade will be based on in class discussion and participation (25%), a research prospectus (25%), and a final paper (50%).

For the final paper, you can submit an original manuscript of a replication *and reimagining* of an existing study in international security. By “replication,” I mean that you should obtain the original data and replicate the results from the paper, if possible. By “reimagining,” I mean that you should conceptualize the question in a wholly different manner (no “I added an interaction term”) and re-analyze the data, augmenting or transforming them if necessary, in such a way that you end up articulating and testing a different *understanding* of the phenomenon in question. This exercise could involve anything from building your own agent-based model, running simulations, and deriving hypotheses to simply exploring the variance or frontier of the data rather than the central tendency. A brief (roughly two-page) prospectus for the research paper, outlining the existing paper and the proposed reimagining, is due on **TBD 8**. The final version of the paper will be due on **TBD 22**.

I subscribe to OSU’s grading rubric: A 93-100, A- 90-92.9, B+ 87-89.9, B 83-86.9, B- 80-82.9, C+ 77-79.9, C 73-76.9, C- 70-72.9, D+ 67-69.9, D 60-66.9, E 0-59.

Academic Misconduct

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Academic Misconduct to investigate or establish procedures for the investigation of all reported cases of student academic misconduct. The term “academic misconduct” includes all forms of student academic misconduct wherever committed;

illustrated by, but not limited to, cases of plagiarism and dishonest practices in connection with examinations. Instructors shall report all instances of alleged academic misconduct to the committee (Faculty Rule 3335-5-487). For additional information, see the Code of Student Conduct <http://studentlife.osu.edu/csc/>.

Students with Disabilities

The University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions), please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options. To establish reasonable accommodations, I may request that you register with Student Life Disability Services. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. The Office of Student Life Disability Services is located in 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue; telephone 614-292-3307, slds@osu.edu; <http://slds.osu.edu/>.

Course Norms

We are trained to rip apart whatever unfortunate piece of literature wanders into their path. There are advantages to such an approach, but not, in my opinion, to pursuing it exclusively: it de-emphasizes the need to think about how one might make a positive contribution to a given literature, and in so doing encourages a form of intellectual atrophy that makes writing a dissertation a long, painful experience filled with self-recrimination and doubt. These have their place, of course, but when they overwhelm intellectual curiosity and creativity the result is dozens of promising draft chapters that are scrapped before they have a chance to develop.

Therefore, when you read a piece of research for this class, you should structure your thinking in terms of three overarching questions:

1. What is good about this piece?
2. What is bad about this piece?
3. How might it be improved?

At the beginning of class, I will ask each student to discuss those three points before we start the discussion. The order of the discussion will be randomly generated at the start of class. Because this means every student will have to participate in the discussion, we are going to read fewer articles than other seminar classes but discuss them in greater detail. For each week, I will provide supplemental articles that you can read outside of the discussion.

Texts

North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Russett, Bruce. (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-2.

Week 1 (TBD 8) **Democratic peace**

Required:

Russett, Bruce. (1993) *Grasping the Democratic Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-2.

Braumoeller, Bear F. (1997) Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States. *International Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 375-402.

Schultz, Kenneth A. (1999) Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. *International Organization* 53(2): 233-266.

Cederman, Lars-Erik. (2001) Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macro-historical Learning Process. *American Political Science Review* 95(1): 15-32.

Supplemental:

North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. (1999) An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. *American Political Science Review* 93(4): 791-807.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. (2002) [Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War](#). *International Organization* 56(2): 297-337.

Ward, Michael D., and Kristian S. Gleditsch. (1998) Democratizing for Peace. *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 51-61.

Cranmer, Skyler J., and Bruce A. Desmarais. "Inferential network analysis with exponential random graph models." *Political analysis* 19.1 (2011): 66-86.

Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth. (1996) Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88. *American Political Science Review* 90(3): 512-533.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Mohan Penubarti Rao. (2001) Exploring the Dynamics of the Democratic Peace. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 818-833.

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. (1998) Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory. *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 377-389.

Dixon, William J., and Paul D. Senese. (2002) Democracy, Disputes, and Negotiated Settlements. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(4): 547-571.

Huth, Paul K., and Todd L. Allee. (2002) Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(6): 754-790.

Baum, Matthew A., and Philip BK Potter. *War and democratic constraint: How the public influences foreign policy*. Princeton University Press, 2015.

Dafoe, Allan. (2011) "Statistical Critiques of the Democratic Peace: Caveat Emptor." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 247-62.

Week 2 (TBD 16) **Dependence and Interdependence**

Required:

Barbieri, Katherine. (1996) Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict? *Journal of Peace Research* 33(1): 29-49.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. (1999) Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict. *Journal of Peace Research* 36(4): 423-442.

Li, Quan, and Erik Gartzke. (2003) Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict Debate. *Journal of Peace Research*.

Gartzke, Erik. "The capitalist peace." *American journal of political science* 51.1 (2007): 166-191.

Barbieri, Katherine, and R. A. Peters II. (2003) Measure for Mis-measure: A Response to Gartzke & Li. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6): 713-719.

Supplemental:

Schweller, Randall L. *Maxwell's demon and the golden apple: Global discord in the new millennium*. JHU Press, 2014.

Oneal, John R. (2003) Measuring Interdependence and Its Pacific Benefits: A Reply to Gartzke & Li. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6): 721-725.

Gartzke, Erik, and Quan Li. (2003) All's Well That Ends Well: A Reply to Oneal, Barbieri & Peters. *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6): 727-732.

Goertz, Gary, Paul Francis Diehl, and Alexandru Balas. *The puzzle of peace: The evolution of peace in the international system*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. (1980) An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 74(4): 917-931.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. (1992) *War and Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gartner, Scott S., and Randolph M. Siverson. (1996) War Expansion and War Outcome. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40(1): 4-15.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian M. Pollins. (2001) The Study of Interdependence and Conflict: Recent Advances, Open Questions, and Directions for Future Research. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 834-859.

Schampel, James H. (1993) Change in Material Capabilities and the Onset of War: A Dyadic Approach. *International Studies Quarterly* 37(4): 395-408.

Signorino, Curtis S. (1999) Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 93(2): 279-297.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Kenneth A. Schultz. (2003) Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information *Political Analysis* 11(4): 345-367.

Week 3 (TBD 29) Interstate Rivalry and Territorial Disputes

Required:

Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. (1995) The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact of Political Shocks. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1): 30-52.

Vasquez, John A. (1996) Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War. *International Studies Quarterly* 40(4): 531-558.

Bennett, D. Scott. (1998) Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration. *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4): 1200-1232.

Simmons, Beth A. (2002) Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(6): 829-856.

Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed. (2001) War and Rivalry among Great Powers. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 457-469.

Heldt, Birger. (1999) Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation, and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(4): 451-478.

Supplemental:

Huth, Paul K. (1996) *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, chs. 1-3.

Bennett, D. Scott. (1996) Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry. *International Studies Quarterly* 40(2): 157-183.

Gartzke, Erik, and Michael W. Simon. (1999) Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries. *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 777-798.

Sartori, Anne. (2002) Enduring Facts about Enduring Rivals. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.

Bennett, D. Scott, and Timothy Nordstrom. (2000). Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1): 33-61.

Geller, Daniel S. (1993) Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads. *International Studies Quarterly* 37(2): 173-193.

Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. (1993) Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns. *International Studies Quarterly* 37(2): 147-171.

Grieg, J. Michael. (2001) Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(6): 691-718.

Week 4 (TBD 29) **Arms Races and Event Dynamics**

Diehl, Paul F. (1983) Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look. *Journal of Peace Research* 20(3): 205-212.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin. "Dangerous bargains with the devil? Incorporating new approaches in peace science for the study of war." *Conflict management and peace science* 34.1 (2017): 98-116.

Sample, Susan G. (1997) Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate. *Journal of Peace Research* 34(1): 7-22.

Diehl, Paul F., and Mark J. C. Crescenzi. (1998) Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate. *Journal of Peace Research* 35(1): 111-118.

Sample, Susan G. (1998) Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(2): 156-175.

Supplemental:

Pevehouse, Jon C., and Joshua S. Goldstein. (1999) Serbian Defiance or Compliance in Kosovo? Statistical Analysis and Real-Time Predictions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(4): 538-546.

Schrodt, Philip A., and Deborah J. Gerner. (2000) Cluster-Based Early Warning Indicators for Political Change in the Contemporary Levant. *American Political Science Review* 94(4): 803-818.

Moore, Will H., and David J. Lanoue. (2003) Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Cold War Conflict Behavior. *The Journal of Politics* 65(2): 376-396.

Dixon, William J. (1986) Reciprocity in United States-Soviet Relations: Multiple Symmetry or Issue Linkage? *American Journal of Political Science* 30(2): 421-445.

Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse. (1997) Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict. *American Political Science Review* 91(3): 515-529.

Goldstein, Joshua S. (1991) Reciprocity in Superpower Relations: An Empirical Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly* 35(2): 195-209. (With erratum in 35(4).)

Goldstein, Joshua S. (1995) Great-Power Cooperation under Conditions of Limited Reciprocity: From Empirical to Formal Analysis. *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4): 453-477.

King, Gary. (1989) Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations and Applications. *International Studies Quarterly* 33(2): 123-147.

Majeski, Stephen J. (1985) Expectations and Arms Races. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(2): 217-245.

Reuveny, Rafael, and Heejoon Kang. (1996) International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger Causality. *American Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 943-970.

Wallace, Michael D. (1982) Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses. *International Studies Quarterly* 26(1): 37-56.

Gerner, Deborah J., and Philip A. Schrodt. (2001) Analyzing the Dynamics of International Mediation Processes in the Middle East and Former Yugoslavia. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL.

Schrodt, Philip A., and Deborah J. Gerner. (1997) Empirical Indicators of Crisis Phase in the Middle East, 1979-1995. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(4): 529-552.

Week 5 (TBD 5) **Alliances**

Bennett, D. Scott. (1997) Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 846-878.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew J. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. (2000) Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 686-699.

Werner, Suzanne, and Douglas Lemke. (1997) Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices. *International Studies Quarterly* 41(3): 529-546.

Levy, Jack S. (1981) Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25(4): 581-613.

Supplemental

Campbell, Benjamin W. "Detecting heterogeneity and inferring latent roles in longitudinal networks." *Political Analysis* 26.3 (2018): 292-311.

Gibler, Douglas M., and John A. Vasquez. (1998) Uncovering the Dangerous Alliances, 1495-1980. *International Studies Quarterly* 42(4): 785-807.

Bremer, Stuart A. (1992) Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2): 309-341.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. (2003) Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3): 427-439.

Olson, Mancur Jr., and Richard Zeckhauser. (1966) An Economic Theory of Alliances. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48(3): 266-279.

Conybeare, John A. C., and Todd Sandler. (1990) The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 1880-1914: A Collective Goods Approach. *American Political Science Review* 84(4): 1197-1206.

Conybeare, John A. C. (1992) A Portfolio Diversification Model of Alliances: The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1879-1914. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1): 53-85.

Li, Richard P., and William R. Thompson. (1978) The Stochastic Process of Alliance Formation Behavior. *American Political Science Review* 72(4): 1288-1303.

Midlarsky, Manus I. (1983) Absence of Memory in the Nineteenth-Century Alliance System: Perspectives from Queuing Theory and Bivariate Probability Distributions. *American Journal of Political Science* 27(4): 762-784.

Siverson, Randolph M., and Harvey Starr. (1994). Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances. *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 145-161.

Week 6 (TBD 12) **System, Structure, and Conflict**

Required:

Braumoeller, Bear F. The great powers and the international system: Systemic theory in empirical perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner. (1996) Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War. *International Studies Quarterly* 40(2): 235-260.

Thompson, William R. (1986) Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30(4): 587-615.

Mattern, Janice Bially, and Ayse Zarakol. "Hierarchies in world politics." *International Organization* 70.3 (2016): 623-654.

Supplemental:

Zarakol, Ayse. "Theorising hierarchies." *Hierarchies in world politics* (2017): 1-14.

McConaughey, Meghan, Paul Musgrave, and Daniel H. Nexon. "Beyond anarchy: Logics of political organization, hierarchy, and international structure." *International Theory* 10.2 (2018): 181-218.

Pollins, Brian M., and Randall L. Schweller. (1999) Linking the Levels: The Long Wave and Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1790-1993. *American Journal of Political Science* 43(2): 431-464.

Huth, Paul, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett. (1993) The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes: Testing Rational Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism. *American Political Science Review* 87(3):609-623.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. (1980) *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Week 7 (TBD 25) **War Duration, Intensity, and Termination**

Required:

Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam III. (1996) The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985. *American Political Science Review* 90(2): 239-257.

Goemans, Henk E. (2000) Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(5): 555-579.

Fortna, Virginia Page. (2003) Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization* 57(2): 337-372.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, T. Warren, and Didier Sornette. (2011) "Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War." *International Organization* 65(4): 605-38.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Christopher J. W. Zorn. (2001) Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science. *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 972-988. **Supplemental:**

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam III. (1998) Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 259-277.

Gelpi, Christopher F., and Michael Griesdorf. (2001) Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94. *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 633-648.

Horowitz, Michael, and Dan Reiter. (2001) When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(2): 147-173.

Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam III. (1998) The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(3): 344-366.

Week 8 (TBD 3) **Civil war**

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. (2001/02) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. ms., World Bank. [Manuscript available online.](#)

Sambanis, Nicholas. (2001) Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 259-282.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90.

Gurr, Ted Robert, and Will H. Moore. (1997) Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessments for the 1990s. *American Journal of Political Science* 41(4): 1079-1103.

Jenkins, J. Craig, and Doug Bond. (2001) Conflict-Carrying Capacity, Political Crisis, and Reconstruction: A Framework for the Early Warning of Political System Vulnerability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(1): 3-31.

Supplemental:

Christia, Fotini. Alliance formation in civil wars. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Davenport, Christian. (1995) Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions. *American Journal of Political Science* 39(3): 683-713.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. (2002) How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(3): 307-334.

Regan, Patrick M. (2002) Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 55-73.

Week 9 (TBD 19) **Political violence**

Required:

Lyall, J. (2009) “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331–62.

Reynal-Querol, Marta. (2002) Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1): 29-54.

Koren, Ore, and Benjamin E. Bagozzi. “Living off the land: The connection between cropland, food security, and violence against civilians.” *Journal of Peace Research* 54.3 (2017): 351-364.

Nyseth Brehm, Hollie. “Subnational determinants of killing in Rwanda.” *Criminology* 55.1 (2017): 5-31.

Larson, Jennifer M., and Janet I. Lewis. “Rumors, kinship networks, and rebel group formation.” *International Organization* 72.4 (2018): 871-903.

Holland, Bradley E., and Viridiana Rios. “Informally governing information: How criminal rivalry leads to violence against the press in Mexico.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.5 (2017): 1095-1119.

Supplemental:

Driscoll, Jesse. *Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States*. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Week 10 (TBD 26) **Terrorism**

Required:

Enders, Walter and Todd Sandler. (2002) Patterns of Transnational Terrorism, 1970-1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates. *International Studies Quarterly* 46(2): 145-65.

Robert A. Pape. (2003) The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343-361.

Krueger, Alan B., and David D. Laitin. (2004) *Kto Kogo? A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism*. [Manuscript available online](#).

Fair, C. Christine, and Bryan Shepherd. (2006) Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(1): 51-74.

Heger, Lindsay, Danielle Jung, and Wendy H. Wong. "Organizing for resistance: How group structure impacts the character of violence." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24.5 (2012): 743-768.

Clauset, Aaron, and Ryan Woodard. (2012). "Estimating the Historical and Future Probabilities of Large Terrorist Events." arXiv preprint arXiv:1209.0089. <http://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0089>

Supplemental:

Wade, Sara Jackson, and Dan Reiter. (2007) Does Democracy Matter?: Regime Type and Suicide Terrorism. *Journal Of Conflict Resolution* 51(2), 329-348.

Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver. (2004) Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America, *American Journal of Political Science* 48(1): 28-46.

Koschade, Stuart. (2006) A Social Network Analysis of *Jemaah Islamiyah*: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(6): 559-575.

Shapiro, Jacob N. *The terrorist's dilemma: Managing violent covert organizations*. Princeton University Press, 2013.

Li, Quan. (2005) Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 278-97.

Engene, Jan Oskar. (2007) Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset. *Journal Of Peace Research* 44(1): 109-121.

Michael Mousseau. (2002/03) Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror, *International Security* 27(3): 5-29.

Jessica Stern. (2002/03) Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons, *International Security* 27(3): 89-123.

Hafez, Mohammed. (2006) Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(6): 591-619.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence". *International Organization* 59:145-176.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2005. "The Quality of Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 515-530.

Week 11 (TBD 26) **Other analytic strategies**

Required:

Shmueli, Galit. (2010) “To Explain or to Predict?” *Statistical Science* 25(3): 289–310.

Robert A. Pape. (2003) The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 343-361.

Zinnes, Dina. (1980) “Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher: Presidential Address.” *International Studies Quarterly* 24(3): 315–342.

Schrodt, Philip A.. (2013) “Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis.” *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 287–300.